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Trade Competitiveness, Subsidies and Barriers to Trade 
Implication for Indian Agriculture 
Yogesh Bandhu  
 
Agriculture in India is the most important segment of the economy. Growth of Agricultural 
sector is crucial for Indian economy as it employs two-third of its population and contributes 
nearly one-third of national income. However its importance in the economic, social and 
political fabric of India goes well beyond what is indicated by its contribution to the economy. 
The large number of poor agricultural households and their income vulnerability are major 
concern among policy makers. These concerns have driven both agricultural policies and public 
expenditures in agriculture in India as well as in other part of the globe. India made significant 
advances towards achieving its goal of rapid agricultural growth, improving food security, and 
reducing rural poverty during the last four decades. Sustainable food production growth 
enabled India to achieve foodgrain self sufficiency, eliminating the threat of famines and acute 
starvation in the country. More rapid agricultural productivity growth, as past experiences 
shows, can have major impacts on poverty reduction trough direct effects on producers 
income, indirect effects on consumer welfare trough changes in food prices, employment and 
wage effects, and growth induced effects throughout the economy.     
Agriculture is also one of the major sources of export earnings of our country and is 
crucial for improving the balance of payments.  In recent years, the export of agricultural and 
allied products accounted for about one-fifth of total export earnings of India.   India's share of 
agricultural export has remained very low in many commodities despite inherent strength of 
Indian agriculture with the exception of few commodities. The performance of agricultural 
export depends not only on adequate surplus, international prices, quality of product, market 
competition and comparative advantage of producing the exportable commodities but also on 
domestic and international trade policy. Hence the subsidies and supports to agricultural 
commodities of country play a major role to stand in international market. 
Present paper is an effort to evaluate competitiveness of Indian wheat and rice in 
international market. Keeping in view the overall foodgrain production, marketable surplus and 
number of farmers, among the major foodgrain producing states, Uttar Pradesh has been taken 
for comparison of trade competitiveness. Since agricultural trade is highly distorted due to huge 
subsidies and support to agriculture in developed countries; paper also evaluate 
competitiveness of these commodities in alternative case if both countries withdraw their 
subsidies to these commodities in form of Producer Support Estimate (PSE). The Paper is 
divided in four parts; Part one is about the methodology to calculate competitiveness. Trade 
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competitiveness of wheat and rice at normal prices and at PSE adjusted prices has been 
calculated in part two. Part three evaluate the implications of agricultural subsidy and part four 
is the concluding part with suggesting some corrective measures for fair agricultural trade and 
due space of developing countries in international agricultural trade. 
 
(I) 
 
Methodology 
Trade competitiveness is a dynamic phenomenon, which would vary depending upon the 
changes in international and domestic prices consequent upon demand and supply of 
commodities and market condition. Opening-up of international Agricultural trade increases 
international competition. In open market, the producers of price effective commodity lead 
competition subject to direct and indirect support/subsidies. Volatility in international prices 
arising out of inter year fluctuations has serious implication for India's export competitiveness 
of agricultural commodities. Trade competitiveness basically depends upon the level of 
domestic prices relative to international prices.  In its simplest form trade competitiveness, say 
export, can be measured by comparing domestic prices with international price expressed in 
domestic prices net of freight, transport and related costs involved in taking produce from 
exporting country to importing country.  If domestic price of any commodity is lower than the 
net export price then the commodity is export competitive otherwise it is not export 
competitive.  Similarly under importable scenario, if domestic price is lower than international 
price plus transportation, freight, insurance and other cost involved in taking produce from 
foreign market to domestic market then domestic produce is import competitive otherwise it is 
not import competitive. There are four measures which has been used to reveal trade 
competitiveness of agricultural commodities these are; Nominal Protection Coefficient (NPC), 
Effective Protection Coefficient (EPC), Effective Subsidy Coefficient (ESC), and Domestic 
Resources Cost (DRC). Out of these four NPC, EPC, ESC are used to measure the level of 
protection/ dis-protection while DRC used to measure the efficiency and comparative 
advantage in production vis-à-vis export import of various commodities.  
The simplest indicator of domestic protection and export competitiveness is Nominal 
Protection Co-efficient (NPC). It is the ratio of domestic prices to international prices net of 
freight, transportation charges (taking produce from exporting country to importing country) 
and traders’ margin. NPC greater than one indicate effective incentive to producers compared 
to free trade scenario and NPC lower than unity indicates that commodity is dis-protected. 
Similarly, NPC<1 indicate the commodity is exportable and NPC>1 indicates the commodity is 
importable.  
The domestic prices used in the estimation of nominal protection are intended to 
approximate by producer prices (FHP) of fair and average quality (FAQ) of wheat and rice that 
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the farmers receive during the harvesti; compiled by FAO data archive. One can use other 
alternative variant of prices available in India i.e. Minimum Support Prices and Wholesale 
Prices. Logically speaking MSP<FHP<WP. In this paper trade competitiveness of wheat and rice 
from Uttar Pradeshii has been compared with U.S wheat and rice, therefore F.O.B. prices of 
wheat and rice at U.S. gulf port has been taken for international pricesiii.  
There can be substantial differences between the prices of different varieties and grades 
of a commodity; keeping this in view care has been taken to specify which is to use for price 
comparisons. For international prices of wheat US Hard winter No.2, West Red Spring No.1, are 
considered.  There are several kinds of international prices quoted for different verities of rice, 
i.e. Diwakar (1993) used Thai Cargo – second grade which is normally 13 per cent Broken, 
however, Gulati et.al. (1991) used Thai – White, 5per cent broken rice. Here U.S. Hard winter 
No.2 verity of wheat has been considered. For rice, FOB price of Thai – White, 5 percent broken 
rice; which is flaky and long slender grain in quality has been considered. 
The market for competition is considered- Tunisia, which is almost equally distance from 
India and U.S. In estimating the nominal protection indicators of farm commodities, transport 
and other related costs - both international and domestic - can make a very large difference. 
International transport costs provide a degree of protection for domestic producers against 
imports, whereas in exporting the domestic producer's price must be low enough to make the 
product competitive in foreign markets, including transport cost to the market. Consequently, 
the observed domestic price of a commodity may well be lower than the import reference 
price, while at the same time substantially exceeding the price that would have to be charged 
to capture export markets. 
Similarly, domestic transport costs provide additional protection to production in inland 
areas, but on the other hand reduce the prices that producers would receive if they were 
competing with imports at a port city, or if they were exporting. The importance of transport 
costs depends on a variety of factors, including the location of foreign suppliers of imports and 
foreign markets for exports, the location of domestic producing areas in relation to the main 
ports, and the value of the commodity in international trade. For example, Pursell and Gupta 
(1996) estimated that under free trade in the 1990s, the price that the farmer would have 
received for wheat under free trade would have been about 40 percent lower than the price at 
which he would have had to compete with imports. By contrast, the estimated free trade 
export price for milled common rice was about 19 percent lower than the corresponding import 
competing price. In order to deal with the resulting ambiguity of the nominal protection 
estimates, the NPC of wheat and rice are calculated under two alternative hypotheses: 
a) The importable hypothesis: when the foreign product is an actual or potential 
substitute for the domestic crop in domestic markets. 
b) The exportable hypothesis: when the domestic crop is or potentially could be 
exported to compete in foreign export markets. 
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As noted above, reference prices are affected by domestic transport and other domestic costs 
as well as by international transport costs. In India, these domestic costs are sometimes as 
great as or larger than international costs. For example, Pursell and Gupta estimated that the 
storage, marketing and transport cost of shipping wheat from Punjab to Bombay is only slightly 
lower than the cost of shipping wheat from the US gulf to India. Hence the price the Punjab 
farmer would receive under free trade depends on where his wheat would have to compete 
with foreign wheat under free trade. For this, some kind of geographical free trade scenario is 
needed which would indicate these points of competition. In this paper it is assumed that under 
free trade import substitutes would compete with imports in the principal port cities, so that 
the reference price in the supplying region would be the landed price of the import in the port 
city minus marketing and transport costs to get the domestic product to the port. Similarly, the 
reference prices of exportables are the estimated F.O.B. prices at the port, minus port charges 
and minus marketing and transport costs from the supplying region to the port.  
Assuming competitive conditions in the upcountry region shipping to the port city, this 
would then be the prevailing price in that region under free trade, since if prices for delivery 
from the same supplying region to any other domestic market were higher, supplies would be 
diverted to that market and the prices would fall to the level of the reference price. 
International freight rates are based on data published in the FAO yearbooks for different 
origins and destinations.  
Moving commodities to be exported from port cities or to compete with imports there 
or elsewhere also involves marketing costs which include interest charges, handling expenses, 
storage charges, overhead expenses, miscellaneous expenses arising out of transit and storage 
losses, and wholesale distribution margins. These costs vary considerably by year, by season 
and by crop. Based on the study by Sharma and a review of a number of studies by Gulati et al 
(1990), in the case of foodgrains and oilseeds in the 1980s, Pursell and Gupta has taken 
marketing costs to consist of an interest charge for two months at an 18 percent rate applied to 
the procurement price, plus Re 1 per quintal to represent other marketing expenses. Diwakar 
has been used marketing cost and trader’s margin as 6 percent of procurement price. Later 
approach has been adopted in this paper. 
 
(II) 
 
Trade competitiveness of Wheat and Rice: 
There are many indicators to evaluate competitiveness of agricultural commodities i.e. Nominal 
Protection Coefficient (NPC), Effective Protection Coefficient (EPC), Effective Subsidy Coefficient 
(ESC) etc. In this paper NPC; which is the simplest indicator of competitiveness has been 
calculated for wheat and rice under both importable and exportable hypothesis. The Tables-1 
below reveals that from the inception of WTO in the case of both, Wheat and Rice the NPC at 
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importable hypothesis is less than one indicating that these two crops are competitive. This 
indicates that U.P. was an efficient producer of Wheat and Rice and can efficiently compete 
with the imports of these commodities. But from 1998-99 as the impact of agreement on 
agriculture started taking place, NPC under importable hypothesis becomes greater than one, 
reflects that these produces turn into non competitive. One of the main reasons for declining 
competitiveness is very hefty falls given to price in international market of both Wheat and Rice 
over the years. 
 
Table-1: Nominal Protection Coefficient of Wheat and Rice 
 
year 
NPC of wheat 
(Importable 
Hypothesis) 
NPC of wheat 
(Exportable 
Hypothesis) 
NPC of rice 
(Importable 
Hypothesis) 
NPC of rice 
(Exportable 
Hypothesis) 
1994-95 0.63 0.66 0.71 0.74 
1995-96 0.50 0.53 0.59 0.62 
1996-97 0.52 0.54 0.77 0.81 
1997-98 0.40 0.41 0.96 1.01 
1998-99 0.53 0.56 1.19 1.25 
1999-2000 1.06 1.11 1.27 1.34 
2000-01 0.89 0.93 1.25 1.31 
2001-02 1.19 1.26 1.21 1.27 
2002-03 1.42 1.50 1.16 1.23 
 
The scenario for exportable hypothesis is rather similar. Although in case of wheat, it has 
retained its competitiveness for some years but recently its production has become non-
competitive. Whereas, in case of rice competitiveness decline earlier in comparison to wheat. 
However over the period, for all these two crops in both cases i.e. importable and exportable 
hypothesis; NPC is attaining closer to one, indicating that the competitiveness is getting eroded. 
It may however, be remembered that rice is one of the highly subsidised commodity by U.S. 
Since the subsidies continue to the quite high level, its international prices tend to remain too 
low. 
Main reason for declining competitiveness of these crops is a general sump in world 
prices of agricultural commodities due to heavy subsidies by the U.S, which has adversely 
affected export prospect of the developing countries. It is interesting to note that despite these 
distortions, India was competitive in the production of both wheat and rice; a removal of trade 
distortions on these commodities would thus be of great advantage to India. The agricultural 
subsidies of developed countries as well as the barriers to agricultural imports erected by U.S., 
6 | P a g e  
 
Europe and Japan prevent countries such as India from fully exploiting their comparative 
advantage. 
This creates a paradox that the richest and the most industrialised countries, which 
enjoy no comparative advantage in agriculture, dominate the world export market for several 
agricultural products. Given their relative labour situation and natural endowment, one would 
expect, on purely economic ground, that they would specialises in the production and export of 
industrial goods, leaving to the poor agricultural countries the production and export of 
agricultural goods But the fact is that despite the high cost of labour and machine, they supply 
agricultural product to the world market at a price that is lower than that quoted by developing 
countries Exporter. The paradox is quite easy to resolve. These countries have succeeded in 
"creating" comparative advantage for their agricultural exports by way of subsidies to their very 
small number of agriculturists. The subsidy is of such an unimaginable scale that it has turned 
what is costly and non-viable and should not be produced in developed countries into one of 
their most lucrative export items.  
 
Competitiveness without Domestic Subsidies:  
Under the Agreement on Agriculture, the impact of domestic support measures is captured 
through the aggregate measurement of support (AMS). Which further divide in product specific 
support (PSE) and in input subsidies i.e. non product specific support. India maintains a product 
price support system in the form of minimum support prices announced by the government for 
different commodities. For India, the total AMS tends to be negative, suggesting taxation rather 
than protection of agriculture. Gulati and Pursell present detailed estimates of the margins of 
protection provided to Indian agriculture by the policies that have been applied. These 
estimates are based on extremely detailed calculations, taking into account transport costs and 
the net trade situation of producers in key regions within India, as well as impacts at the 
border. The negative producer support observed in India stands in very sharp contrast to the 
high levels of support observed in U.S., E.U. and OECD countries, where Producer Support 
Estimates averages over 30 per cent. These high rates of protection reduce the demand for 
agricultural products and hence reduce the demand for exports from India and other net 
agricultural exporters. 
The exporters of agricultural products do not receive direct export subsidies in India. 
However, the U.S., E.U. and developed countries provide export subsidies vis a vis direct 
product specific subsidies  for several commodities like wheat, rice, coarse grains, oilseeds, 
vegetable oils, sugar, dairy products, fruits and vegetables, which are of great significance for 
food security in developing countries. Five-sixths of all export subsidies in the mid 1990s were 
granted by the EU and all but 2 per cent of the rest were on account of exports-support 
measures given by the US, Norway and Switzerland. Export subsidies have far-reaching trade-
distorting affects. In developed countries, the Total Support Estimate (TSE), exceeding US $310 
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billion, encourages overproduction and causes world price levels to fall close to, and even 
undercut, producer costs in developing countries. The figure below shows the Producer support 
estimates for wheat and rice in India and US. However, if we eliminate the Product Specific 
Support which is a small part of total support for concern commodities i.e. wheat and rice in 
both countries the competitive situation will be different. 
 
Figure-1: PSE in India and US 
 
 
 
Table-2: NPC of Wheat and Rice after PSE Adjustment 
 
year 
NPC of Wheat 
(Importable 
Hypothesis) 
NPC of wheat 
(Exportable 
Hypothesis) 
NPC of rice 
(Importable 
Hypothesis) 
NPC of rice 
(Exportable 
Hypothesis) 
1994-95 0.38 0.39 0.77 0.80 
1995-96 0.45 0.47 0.63 0.66 
1996-97 0.46 0.48 0.83 0.87 
1997-98 0.36 0.38 0.96 1.01 
1998-99 0.47 0.49 1.01 1.07 
1999-2000 0.92 0.96 1.03 1.08 
2000-01 0.89 0.93 1.04 1.09 
2001-02 0.98 1.03 1.01 1.06 
2002-03 0.96 1.01 1.09 1.15 
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Figure-2: NPC of Wheat (Exportable Hypothesis) 
 
 
 
Figure-3: NPC of Wheat (Importable Hypothesis) 
 
 
Producer support Estimates (PSE) in India for wheat was negative from 1995-96 to 1997-98 
after that it become positive for last few years. For rice it was negative from 1988-89 to 1999-
2000. From the year 2000 it become some positive While in U.S. average Producer Support 
Estimate for 1998-2000 was 45 percent for wheat and 31 percent for rice. Studies suggest that 
total AMS in India is much below the WTO commitment while in U.S. and other developed 
NPC o f  Wh e a t  (E x po r t a b l e  Hy po t h e s is )
0 .0 0
0 .2 0
0 .40
0 .6 0
0 .8 0
1.0 0
1.2 0
1.40
1.6 0
19 9 4-
9 5
19 9 5 -
9 6
19 9 6 -
9 7
19 9 7 -
9 8
19 9 8 -
9 9
19 9 9 -
2 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 -
0 1
2 0 0 1-
0 2
2 0 0 2 -
0 3
Ye a r
N
P
C
NPC o f  whe a t  Af t e r  ps e  Ad j . (E x po r t a b l e  Hy po t he s is )
NPC o f  WHE AT (E x po r t a b l e  Hy po t he s is )
NPC= 1
NPC o f  Whe a t  ( Impo r t a b l e  Hy po t h e s is )
0 .0 0
0 .2 0
0 .40
0 .6 0
0 .8 0
1.0 0
1.2 0
1.40
1.6 0
19 9 4-
9 5
19 9 5 -
9 6
19 9 6 -
9 7
19 9 7 -
9 8
19 9 8 -
9 9
19 9 9 -
2 0 0 0
2 0 0 0 -
0 1
2 0 0 1-
0 2
2 0 0 2 -
0 3
Ye a r
N
P
C
NPC o f  Whe a t  Af t e r  ps e  Ad j . (Im po r t a b l e  Hy po t he s is )
NPC OF Whe a t  (Im po r t a b l e  Hy po t he s is )
NPC= 1
9 | P a g e  
 
countries their support to agriculture is continued in different form and does not declined 
despite their commitment, contentions and many round of talks under the auspicious of WTO.  
 
Figure-4: NPC of Rice (Importable Hypothesis) 
 
 
 
Figure-4: NPC of Rice (Exportable Hypothesis) 
 
 
We have seen that competitiveness of Indian agricultural commodities will increase if we adjust 
all the support given to agriculture in both countries. Because AMS is maintained in aggregate 
rather than in product-specific terms in U.S. and many other developed countries. 
Consequently, such countries have been able to increase the domestic support for sensitive 
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products such as rice, sugar and dairy products. On the other hand AMS in India tend to be 
negative in recent past.  
Breakdown of total support into its components: producer support, support granted to 
agriculture in general, and consumer support suggest that since 2000-01 in U.S.  PSE has 
declined from 50.2 percent to 41.7 percent, while General Support Service Estimates (GSSE) 
and Consumer Support Estimates (CSE) have increased from 25.2 to 31.6 and 17.9 to 26.7 
percent respectively in same period. Amount of Total Support Estimates (TSE) also in this 
period; instead of decline has increased from US $ 93,504 million to US $ 96,972 million. 
Support granted to agriculture in general gives indication of the real danger of “non trade 
concerns” being used as substitute for straight protection in United States and other developed 
countries. Further decomposition of PSE in U.S. reveals that input subsidies has increased 168 
percent in period from 2000-01 to 2003-04. 
  
(III) 
 
Continued Protection in Developed Countries and their Implications: 
Besides subsidising the agriculture U.S. and other developed countries are using so many 
erstwhile instruments to protect their agricultural commodities; these includes border barriers, 
non border price based and quantity based instruments. Agriculture sector in U.S. and E.U. 
doesn’t need virtual support. Motive behind supporting their agriculture sector is to dominate 
the world trade by artificially make their produce exportable by keeping agricultural prices at 
low level. Main objective to support agriculture in U.S. are expanding market access abroad and 
maintain current farm lifestyle. For this purpose all policy directions has been made. Floor price 
support, domestic support subsidies and link support to environment are the main instrument 
along with export subsidies, restricted import access, production quota reduction, area 
reduction program and many others. The E.U. too is a major foul player of world trade. PSE in 
E.U. has decrease in recent years but subsequently it increases its input subsidies, indirect 
support to agriculture and consumer support estimates and provided preferential access to 
expand its market abroad. 
Despite the establishment of the Agreement on Agriculture in the WTO, aimed at 
reducing subsidies and protection, the developed countries have continued high protection of 
their agriculture.  This is largely due to the weaknesses of the AoA and its implementation. 
Firstly, the high tariffs on selected items of potential interest to the South have had to be 
reduced only slightly. In the first year of the agreement, there were tariff peaks at very high 
rates in the United States, the EEC, Japan and Canada.  The AoA mandates the developed 
countries to reduce their tariffs by only 36% on average to the end of 2000, and thus the rates 
for some products remain prohibitively high. Secondly, domestic support has increased rather 
than decrease.  Although developed countries reduced their Amber Box subsidies (as the AoA 
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has obliged them to), they also increased the exempted subsidies (under the Blue and Green 
Boxes), resulting in an increase in total domestic support.  Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) data show that the Total Support Estimate (TSE), a 
measure of domestic support,  of the 24 OECD countries rose from US$275.6 billion (annual 
average for base period 1986-88) to US$326 billion in 1999  (OECD 2000). Thirdly, export 
subsidies are still high as the AoA only obliges the developed countries to reduce the budget 
outlay by 36% and the total quantity of exports covered by the subsidies by 21%. Thus, even in 
2000 export subsidies were allowed to be as high as 64% of the base level in 1986-90. It is 
established fact that such subsidised imports from developed countries have suppressed the 
prices of agricultural goods in India and other developing countries. The cyclical nature of prices 
of agricultural products, coupled with the exceptionally high amount of subsidies, has posed a 
threat to farmers in India. 
Farmers in India and other developing countries incur losses in three ways:  
(a)  They lose export opportunities and revenues from having their market access 
blocked in the developed countries using the subsidies; 
(b)  They lose export opportunities in third countries, because the subsidizing country is 
exporting to these countries at artificially low prices; 
(c)  They lose their market share in their own domestic market, or even lose their 
livelihoods, due to the inflow of artificially cheap subsidized imports. 
 
There are many studies to suggest that Indian agricultural exports are competitive in some 
extent in the world market. But currently, Indian farm goods do not pass this test because of so 
many reasons. The alternative calculation of NPC after PSE adjustment suggest that India has a 
large export potential provided the developed countries remove their trade barriers and 
withdraw high domestic support to agriculture. India can easily withstand competition from 
abroad for import of most of the crops even at the current level of tariffs without having a big 
wedge in term of custom duty. Huge export subsidy and domestic support being given by the 
developed countries to their agriculture is a major factor for decline in international prices. 
However the import competitiveness is getting reduced overtime because of currently a global 
recession and general down turn in agricultural prices.  
 
(IV) 
 
Corrective Measures to Level the Field: 
The agriculture in developing countries is critical to food security, poverty reduction and 
economic growth. It is therefore crucial that agricultural trade rules are designed to foster 
agricultural growth. However the system which governs world agricultural trade, in the form of 
WTOs Agreement on Agriculture, is inherently unjust. It legalise the unfair trading practices by 
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developed countries, thereby denying the chance to benefit. Developed countries have clearly 
stacked the advantage of the AoA in their own favour. Tailoring the rules to their specific 
situation, they have secured the right to subsidise their own farmers at almost unlimited level. 
Since the introduction of the Agreement on Agriculture in 1995, domestic subsidies in the OECD 
countries have not fallen.  
Developing countries like India have limited funds to subsidies agricultural development, 
see domestic market protection as the major policy instrument to support their agricultural 
sectors and secure the livelihood of their rural poor. Keeping these facts in view the WTOs post 
Hong Kong development are critical to address the basic issues. Instead of working towards 
rebalancing the current agreement, developed countries are continuously protecting their farm 
sector and completely failed to register the very specific needs of developing countries. 
Achieving an equitable outcome from the WTO agricultural negotiations is still looked-for. 
Therefore WTOs, AoA should be amended in order to: 
 
 End of all form of dumping of agricultural products; which not merely consist the 
elimination of export subsidies as negotiated in Hong Kong, but also a stronger discipline 
on domestic subsidies that facilitate export dumping, stronger discipline on food aid; the 
right of developing countries to apply additional tariff duties while phasing out trade 
distorting support. 
 Recognise the special position of developing countries by providing meaningful special 
and differential treatment such as; lower reduction for developing countries on tariffs, 
internal support and export subsidies; market access under Tariff Rate Quotas 
preferentially allocated to developing countries and; 
 Improved Market Access condition for developing countries. 
 
As long as the subsidies continue, the dumping of artificially cheapened agricultural products to 
developing countries will continue. This has serious effects on rural livelihoods and food 
security in developing countries. Artificially cheapened products are being imported into 
developing countries.  Often, the countries like India may have more efficient farmers, but their 
livelihoods are threatened by inefficient farmers in developed countries because of subsidies. 
The elimination of subsidies are how much important, it is reflecting in incessantly failure of 
Doha Development Round and related trade negotiations since 2000-01. Even the much hyped 
post Hong Kong dead line of April 30, 2006 to resolve the subsidy issue is passed but there is no 
consensus to breakthrough the deadlocks. The massage is clear; subsidies to agriculture are 
most important matter to level the field and to provide the equal opportunity, so it can not be 
overlooked.     
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Notes: 
 
i
 Farm Harvest Prices is that the farmers receive during six to eight week after harvest. 
ii
 Barely and Gaziabad markets has been selected as export point of Rice and Wheat respectively from 
Uttar Pradesh. These markets are selected on behalf of size of market, market arrivals, and variety of 
particular commodity etc. 
iii
 A reference price has been defined as what the prices of the domestic varieties would have been during 
the same period under conditions of free trade at the same exchange rate. 
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